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In this  article,  we  determine  a charge  on  balance  that  is equivalent  to a certain  ﬁxed  charge  on  ﬂow  for
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system  of  individual  accounts.  We  also  prove,  under  market  completeness,  that  the  equivalent  charge  on
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En  este artículo  se determina  una  exacción  en el  balance,  que  es equivalente  a cierta  tasa  ﬁja  en  el  ﬂujo  de
una  empresa  asociada  particular  maximizadora,  que  participa  en  un  fondo  de  pensiones  de  aportaciónalabras clave:
ondo de pensiones
eneﬁcio deﬁnido
uenta individual
xacción en el balance
xacción en el ﬂujo
deﬁnida  en  el  sistema  de  cuentas  individuales.  También  se prueba,  en  la integridad  del  mercado,  que  la
exacción  de tipo  equivalente  en  el  balance  depende  solo  del  nivel  actual  de  la  tasa  en  el  ﬂujo, la  duración
del  período  de  acumulación  y  un  tipo  de  rentabilidad  sin  riesgo.
© 2016  Universidad  ESAN.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Este  es un  artı´culo  Open  Access  bajo
la CC  BY-NC-ND  licencia  (http://creativecommons.org/licencias/by-nc-nd/4.0/).. Introduction
Two important characteristics of a deﬁned–contribution (DC)
ension fund are that afﬁliates borne the risk derived from ﬂuc-
uations in the value of assets and that imposed administrative
harges have a direct and signiﬁcant impact on the terminal wealth
f the corresponding individual account (IA). For example, Murthi,
rszag, and Orszag (2001) estimate that in the U.K. over 40% of the
E-mail address: lchavezbedoya@esan.edu.pe
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jefas.2016.03.003
077-1886/© 2016 Universidad ESAN. Published by Elsevier Espan˜a, S.L.U. This is an open a
y-nc-nd/4.0/).IA’s value is dissipated through fees and charges while Whitehouse
(2001) determines that a levy of one per cent of assets adds up
to nearly 20% of the ﬁnal pension value. Administrative charges
have also received a great deal of attention from the pension
supervisory agencies, policy-makers and researchers, especially
in countries that have partially or totally transformed their public
deﬁned-beneﬁt pension systems into individual capitalization
ones. The most familiar and documented example is Chile and the
reader can ﬁnd main aspects of such reform in Arrau, Valdés-Prieto,
and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993), Diamond and Valdes-Prieto (1994),
Edwards (1998), Arenas de Mesa and Mesa-Lago (2006). Also,
Queisser (1998), Sinha (2000), Kay and Kritzer (2001), Mesa-Lago
ccess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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2006), Kritzer, Kay, and Sinha (2011) and Marthans, J. and Stok,
. (2013) provide good references for the reform, situation and
erspective of pension systems in Latin America.
As mentioned by Mitchell et al. (1998), James, Smalhout, and
ittas (2001) and Whitehouse (2001) the high charges of IA systems
s one of their main criticisms since they discourage participa-
ion (as people consider contributions as taxes instead of savings),
amage the reputation of the system, reduce future pensions, and
ncrease future costs for the government whether there is guar-
nteed minimum pension. Devesa-Carpio, Rodríguez-Barrera, and
idal-Meliá (2003) consider that the charge scheme adopted by
he IA system is very important since fund accumulation process
s exponential and targeted for long horizons. Following Kritzer
t al. (2011), the most common administrative charges in IA pen-
ion systems are proportional on ﬂow (or a percentage of the
fﬁliate’s salary), ﬁxed on ﬂow, proportional on assets (balance)
nd proportional over excess returns. Analysis and comparison
f administrative charges across different countries can be found
n James et al. (2001), Whitehouse (2001), Devesa-Carpio et al.
2003), Corvera, Lartigue, and Madero (2006), Gómez-Hernandez
nd Stewart (2008), Tapia and Yermo (2008). Moreover, Sinha
2001), Masias and Sánchez (2007) and Martínez and Murcia (2008)
nalyze in detail the administrative charges in Mexico, Peru and
olombia, respectively.
However, this article will focus only on charges that are propor-
ional on balance and ﬂow since they are by far the most popular
nd important in Latin America1. Queisser (1998) considers that the
harge on ﬂow is more advantageous for the Pension Fund Admin-
strator (PFA) in the initial stages of the system, and although the
harge on balance aligns the PFA’s objectives in terms of increasing
he fund’s proﬁtability, it tends to be more expensive in the long-
un as personal accounts grow in size. On the other hand, Shah
1997) mentions that the charge on ﬂow generates distortions and
ndesirable tendencies like promoting high start-up costs for the
FAs, discouraging competition in the system and generating losses
or older afﬁliates.
Asset allocation, performance and risk of a DC pension plan
uring its accumulation and decumulation phases have received
 considerable attention in the literature. Blake, Cairns, and Dowd
2001) using different models for asset returns and portfolio strate-
ies estimate the value-at-risk of the pension ratio. Poterba, Rauh,
nd Venti (2005) calculate the expected utility of retirement wealth
or different investment strategies and assumptions. Devolder,
osch Princep, and Domínguez Fabián (2003) derive several opti-
al  portfolio strategies for different types of utility functions
ssuming the risky asset follows a geometric Brownian motion
GBM). Gao (2009) provides a similar analysis but under a con-
tant elasticity variance (CEV) process for the risky assets. The
fﬁciency of the mean-variance portfolio selection in a DC pension
lan is studied in Vigna (2014) when the risky asset follows a GBM.
aberman and Vigna (2001) consider downside risk of an opti-
al  asset allocation strategy derived from a discrete-time dynamic
rogramming approach. Salary risk and inﬂation risk were incor-
orated in Battocchio and Menoncin (2004) and Han and Hung
2012) while maximizing the expected utility of terminal wealth.
attocchio, Menoncin, and Scaillet (2004) and Yang and Huang
2009) incorporate longevity risk in the optimal asset allocation
f a DC plan; the former using as objective expected utility, and the
atter deviation of terminal wealth with respect to a predetermined
arget. Stochastic lifestyling under terminal utility with habit for-
ation is found and compared with other strategies in Cairns,
1 On the one hand, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, El Salvador, Peru, and Uruguay have
harges on ﬂow. On the other hand, Mexico, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay have
harges on assets. Notice that in Bolivia and Peru both type of charges coexist. and Administrative Science 21 (2016) 2–7 3
Blake, and Dowd (2006). Finally, the reader interested in the anal-
ysis and optimal allocation during the decumulation phase can be
referred, among others, to Blake et al. (2001), Gerrard, Haberman,
and Vigna (2004), Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus  (2006) and
Gerrard, Haberman, and Vigna (2006).
Nonetheless, methodologies to compare administrative charges
in DC pension fund with IA during its accumulation period have
not received that level of attention in the literature, especially in a
continuous-time stochastic setting. Therefore, we ﬁll such gap by
developing a methodology, in the aforementioned environment, to
determine equivalent charges on ﬂow and balance. We  consider a
risk-averse afﬁliate who maximizes her expected utility of termi-
nal wealth in a complete Black-Scholes market model2. Then, we
determine the equivalent charges by equating the maximum ter-
minal certainty equivalent that can be achieved under both kinds of
charges. Moreover, under certain assumptions, we  prove that the
equivalent charges on balance and ﬂow depend only on the length
of the accumulation period and the risk-free rate of return; and,
to the best of our knowledge this relationship between charges is
new in the literature. This result is independent on the risky asset’s
growth rate and volatility, as well as, the afﬁliate’s risk-aversion
since the comparison of administrative charges can be performed
by simple terminal wealth expectations under a risk-neutral prob-
ability measure.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces a
methodology to mathematically represent and compare charges on
balance and ﬂow. Section 3 discusses an application of the method-
ology to the Peruvian Private Pension System. Finally, Section 4
draws conclusions.
2. Methodology
Throughout this paper (˝,  F, P,
{
Ft
}
t≥0) represents a ﬁltered
and complete probability space on which a standard
{
Ft
}
t≥0
–adapted one-dimensional Brownian motion B(t) is deﬁned. We
denote by L2F (0,  T, R) the set of all R  -valued, measurable stochas-
tic processes g(t) adapted to
{
Ft
}
t≥0, such that E[
T∫
0
|g(t)|2dt] < ∞.
For any t ∈ [0,  T], we assume that the PFA can invest the afﬁliate’s
contributions in only two assets which satisfy:
dP0 (t) = rP0 (t)dt, P0 (0) = P0 > 0, (1)
dP1 (t) = P1 (t)dt + P1 (t)dB (t) , P1 (0) = P1 > 0. (2)
It is clear that r is the risk-free rate of return,  and  are the
risky asset’s growth rate and volatility, respectively. The stochastic
differential equation (SDE) in (2) generates a geometric Brownian
motion (GBM) which is a common speciﬁcation to model asset val-
ues and it is heavily utilized in stochastic control of DC pension
funds as mentioned in the introduction. But most important, assets
(1) and (2) generate a complete ﬁnancial market and therefore it
guarantees the existence of a risk-neutral probability measure. This
property will be extremely useful to verify our theoretical results
of Section 2.4.
2.1. The afﬁliate’s problemConsider a particular PFA’s afﬁliate who has T > 0 months before
retirement, i.e., T represents the length of her accumulation phase.
She already has W0 > 0 ready to be invested in her individual
2 This market consists on a risky asset following a geometric Brownian motion
and  a risk-free asset. Both assets can be traded continuously and frictionless.
4 nance
a
s
t
i
a
a
a
d
w
e
o
d
w
V
e
a
f
a
s
n
U
−
D
t
x
a
V
d
x
u
E
b
C
v L. Chávez–Bedoya / Journal of Economics, Fi
ccount, and after that initial deposit she will contribute at a con-
tant rate  > 0 per month for the next T months. Also, for any
 ε[0, T] let x (t) ∈ L2F (0, T, R) be the proportion of her IA that is
nvested in the risky asset. We  also assume that the adjustments
re performed instantly and free of charge. Let W(t) be the afﬁli-
te’s wealth in her IA at time t ∈ [0, T]. If the PFA does not charge
ny administrative fees to the afﬁliate, then W(t) satisﬁes
W (t) = [W (t)
[
x (t) + (1 − x (t))r] + 
]
dt + W (t) x (t)dB (t) ,
(3)
ith W(0) = W0.
It is in the afﬁliate’s interest that the PFA will maximize her
xpected utility of terminal wealth, E[U(W (T))], by determining an
ptimal proportion x∗ (t). We  assume that U is strictly increasing,
ifferentiable and concave in its domain. Therefore, the afﬁliate
ants the PFA to solve problem (P) given by
Max  E[U(W (T))]
St. x(t) ∈ L2F (0,  T; R)
dW (t) =
[
W (t) [x (t) ( − r) + r] + 
]
dt + W (t) x (t)dB (t)
W (0) = W0.
Introducing V, the value function of the problem, we  have
(t, W) = max{x}E[U(W (T))|W (t) = W]. (4)
Following Vigna (2014), it is possible to ﬁnd a closed-form
xpression for the value function and the optimal control under
 general hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) class of utility
unctions. Because the main result of the paper regarding equiv-
lent charges will be independent of risk-aversion, we choose for
implicity a particular case of the HARA class given by the expo-
ential utility function. Then:
(W) =  −1
c
e−cW, c > 0. (5)
The utility in (5) exhibits constant absolute risk aversion since
U′′(W)
U′(W) = c and it allows an explicit solution for (P). Following
evolder et al. (2003), the optimal proportion to be invested in
he risky asset is
∗ (t) = e
−r(T−t)
W
  − r
2c
, (6)
nd the corresponding value function is
(t, W) = − 1
c
exp
{
−c
(
er(T−t)W0 + 
(
er(T−t) − 1
r
)
+ 1
2
( − r)2
2c
(T − t)
)}
.
(7)
We  can observe from (6) that the optimal control does not
epend on the contribution rate . If we apply the optimal strategy
∗(t) stated in (6), then W (T) = W¯(T) and the maximum expected
tility of terminal wealth is[
U
(
W¯ (T)
)]
= V (0, W0)
= −1
c
exp
{
−c
(
erTWo + 
(
erT − 1
r
)
+ 1
2
( − r)2
2c
T
)}
. (8)
Moreover, the certainty equivalent of W¯ (T), CE
(
W¯ (T)
)
, is given
y
( ) ( erT − 1) 1 ( − r)2
E W¯ (T) = erTW0 +  r + 2 2c T. (9)
As we can notice from (9), CE
(
W¯ (T)
)
is the sum of the future
alue of W0, the future value of a continuous annuity with rate  and Administrative Science 21 (2016) 2–7
(both using the risk-free rate r) and a term depending on the market
price of risk and the risk aversion parameter but independent of any
contribution made to the IA.
Next, we describe in detail the charges that the PFA will apply
either on the afﬁliate’s IA or on her contributions. We will use a
structure similar to the one considered in Shah (1997), Diamond
(2000), Blake and Board (2000), Whitehouse (2001), Devesa-Carpio
et al. (2003) and Gómez-Hernández and Stewart (2008).
2.2. Charge on balance
Let ı > 0 be the monthly charge on balance expressed in con-
tinuous time. It is also known as charge on assets or on stock and,
in general, it is applied as a percentage of the value of assets under
management. The afﬁliate wants to study the value of her IA under
this type of charge. If we denote such wealth as Ws(t), it will satisfy
the following SDE
dWs (t) =
[
Ws (t)
[
xs (t) ( − r) + r − ı
]
+ 
]
dt
+ Ws (t) xs (t)dB (t) , (10)
with Ws (0) = W0. Notice that the charge on balance will diminish
the monthly growth rates  and r by a quantity equal to ı. We  will
use a control xs(t) to indicate the fraction of the IA invested in the
risky asset under the charge on balance. In this case, the afﬁliate
wants to solve problem (Ps) given by
Max  E[U(Ws (T))]
St. xs (t) ∈ L2F (0,  T; R)
dWs (t) =
[
Ws (t)
[
xs (t) ( − r) + r − ı
]
+ 
]
dt
+Ws (t) xs (t)dB (t)
Ws (0) = W0.
Based on the results and assumptions regarding the exponential
utility function, the optimal strategy for (Ps) is
x∗s (t) =
e−(r−ı)(T−t)
Ws
 − r
2c
, (11)
while the maximum certainty equivalent is
CE
(
Ws (T)
)
= e(r−ı)TW0 + 
(
e(r−ı)T − 1
r − ı
)
+ 1
2
( − r)2
2c
T. (12)
Notice that the last term of (12) does not depend on the initial
contribution (W0), the charge on balance (ı), and the contribution
rate (). Next, we describe the charge on ﬂow.
2.3. Charge on ﬂow
Let  ˛ > 0 be the charge on ﬂow and it could be applied as a
fraction of the afﬁliate’s salary or contributions. Whether the afﬁl-
iate makes a contribution X in a particular month, we  assume the
charge she will pay to the PFA (at the moment the contribution is
made) will be F = (1 − e−˛)X. Considering that F could have been
invested in the fund, it is possible to express contribution X as e−˛X
when adjusted for the opportunity cost of F. In the case of a constant
rate of contribution, , the charge on ﬂow will generate an adjusted
contribution rate of e−˛.
The afﬁliate wants to study the value of her individual account
under this type of charge. We  denote such wealth as Wf (t) and it
will satisfy the following SDE:
dWf (t) =
[
Wf (t)
[
xf (t) ( − r) + r
]
+ e−˛
]
dt
+ Wf (t) xf (t)dB (t) , (13)
nance
w
“
b
o
i
a
e
c
x
a
C
m
l
2
a
s
a
d
R
c
w
w
U
w
b
R
v
u
s
i
o
˛
o
this situation has partially motivated the present research article3.
We consider a retirement age of 65 years and ignore the manda-
tory insurance fee. We will work with three charges on ﬂowL. Chávez–Bedoya / Journal of Economics, Fi
ith Wf (0) = e−˛W0. Recall that Wf (T) does not represent the
true” wealth of the afﬁliate at the end of the accumulation phase
ut the ﬁnal wealth adjusted by the opportunity cost of the charge
n ﬂow. Then, random variables Wf (T) and Ws(T) can be compared.
We will use a control xf (t) to indicate the fraction of the IA
nvested in the risky asset under the charge on ﬂow. Thus, the
fﬁliate wants to solve the problem (Pf) given by
Max  E[U(Wf (T))]
St. xf (t) ∈ L2F (0,  T; R)
dWf (t) =
[
Wf (t)
[
xf (t) ( − r) + r
]
+ e−˛
]
dt
+Wf (t) xf (t)dB (t)
Wf (0) = e−˛W0.
Based on the previous results and assumptions regarding the
xponential utility function, the optimal control and the maximum
ertainty equivalent of (Pf) are
∗
f (t) =
e−r(T−t)
Wf
 − r
2c
, (14)
nd
E
(
Wf (T)
)
= e−˛
[
erTW0 + 
(
erT − 1
r
)]
+ 1
2
( − r)2
2c
T. (15)
Similar to (12), only the last term of (15) depends only on the
arket price of risk
(
−r

)
, the risk aversion parameter (c) and the
ength of the accumulation period.
.4. Comparing charges on balance and ﬂow
The afﬁliate wants to compare her optimal expected utility of
djusted terminal wealth under the two types of charges con-
idered. Therefore, it is appropriate to contrast both CE
(
Ws (T)
)
nd CE
(
Wf (T)
)
given by (12) and (15), respectively. Moreover, we
eﬁne the following ratio to establish such comparison
sf =
CE
(
Ws (T)
)
CE
(
Wf (T)
) (16)
If Rsf > 1, the charge on balance will be preferred. If Rsf < 1 the
harge on ﬂow will be preferred. Finally, when Rsf = 1 the afﬁliate
ill be indifferent between both schemes.
We will consider W0 = 0, i.e., the accumulation phase begins
ith an amount equal to zero in the afﬁliate’s individual account.
nder this assumption and considering all the other variables ﬁxed,
e can express ratio Rsf in (16) as a function of the charge on
alance ı. For the exponential utility function we have:
sf
(
ı
)
=

(
e(r−ı)T −1
r−ı
)
+ 12
(−r)2
2c
T
e−˛
(
erT −1
r
)
+ 12
(−r)2
2c
T
. (17)
Given ˛∗, let ı∗ be the equivalent charge on balance, that is, the
alue ı∗ such that Rsf
(
ı∗
)
in (17) is equal to one. Thus, ı∗ satisﬁes
e(r−ı
∗)T − 1
r − ı∗ = e
−˛∗
(
erT − 1
r
)
. (18)
The left-hand side of (18) is the future value at T of a contin-
ous annuity with unit rate and interest r − ı∗. The right-hand
ide corresponds to the future value at T of a continuous annu-
∗
ty with rate e−˛ and interest r. If we denote the future values
f such annuities as s¯T¯(r−ı∗) and e
−˛∗ s¯T¯r , then (18) is equivalent to∗ = ln(s¯T¯r/s¯T¯(r−ı∗)). Moreover, we can observe that ı∗ will depend
nly on r, T and ˛∗. Hence, it is independent of the parameters  and Administrative Science 21 (2016) 2–7 5
and  of the risky asset, the contribution rate  and the risk aversion
coefﬁcient c. Finally, notice from (18) that if T and r increases then
ı∗ decreases, improving the relative performance of the charge on
ﬂow with respect to the charge on balance.
In the next section we generalize equation (18) for any risk-
averse afﬁliate as described in Section 2.1.
2.5. Equivalent charges in a complete market
As mentioned before, the ﬁnancial market consisting of the risk-
free asset and the risky asset given by (1) and (2) is complete. Also,
given x∗s (t) and x∗f (t), the optimal controls of problems (Ps) and (Pf),
we can determine both Ws (T) and Wf (T). The equivalent charges
of ﬂow and balance can be obtained by comparing the expected
present values of their corresponding IAs under the risk-neutral
probability measure Q.  For that purpose we  deﬁne the ratio Nsf as:
Nsf =
EQ
[
Ws (T)
]
EQ
[
Wf (T)
] . (19)
The ratio in (19) is equivalent to the expected present values of
Ws (T) and Wf (T) using probability measure Q since the factor e−rT
appears in both numerator and denominator of (19). Additionally,
if Nsf > 1, the charge on balance will be preferred. If Nsf < 1 the
charge on ﬂow will be preferred; and, when Nsf = 1 the afﬁliate
will be indifferent between both schemes.
It is clear that both ps = e−rT EQ
[
Ws (T)
]
and pf =
e−rT EQ
[
Wf (T)
]
represent the current prices of the afﬁliate’s
IA accounts under the corresponding charges. For example, ps
is the amount of money that the afﬁliate will receive today in
exchange of giving her IA (entirely) at the end of the accumulation
phase, in this case it is assumed that the charge is on balance, and
that she will continue to contribute to the fund at a rate  until T.
Under Q both the risk free rate and the risky assets grow at a
rate r, then for ﬁxed charges  ˛ and ı we  have:
EQ
[
Ws (T)
]
= e(r−ı)TWo + 
(
e(r−ı)T − 1
r − ı
)
, (20)
EQ
[
Wf (T)
]
= erTWo + 
(
erT − 1
r
)
. (21)
Given ˛∗N , let ı
∗
N be the equivalent charge on balance, that is, the
value ı∗N such that Nsf
(
ı∗N
)
= 1. Then, it is easy to verify that ı∗N also
satisﬁes equation (18) when W0 = 0. This framework is far more
general than the particular case of the exponential utility func-
tion because the comparison of administrative charges performed
through the ratio Nsf will be valid for any risk-averse afﬁliate.
3. Numerical application
In this section, we present an application of the proposed
methodology to the Peruvian Private Pension System. This appli-
cation is relevant because the PPS is going through an important
reform exactly 20 years after its creation. Part of the reform con-
sists of replacing the charge on ﬂow with a charge on balance, and3 Peruvian Law No.29903 contains the main aspects of the reform. One  is that
afﬁliates will migrate to a mixed charge that has a 10-year transient ﬂow compo-
nent, and from year 10 onwards the charge will be only on balance. The reform also
includes a bidding mechanism on charges to allocate new afﬁliates and norms to
incorporate independent workers.
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Table 1
Equivalent annualized charge on balance, ı∗ , such that Rsf
(
ı∗
)
= 1 for different
ages and charges on ﬂow. We  have considered r = 0.037%, constant contribution
rate, and the following charges on ﬂow: fmin = 1.47%, fmax = 1.69%, and favg = 1.58%
(the charges are based on salary and assume a mandatory contribution of 10% of the
afﬁliate’s salary).
Age (years) Equivalent charge on balance (in % and yearly)
fmin = 1.47% favg = 1.58% fmax = 1.69%
20 0.704 0.763 0.824
21 0.720 0.781 0.843
22 0.738 0.800 0.863
23 0.756 0.820 0.885
24 0.775 0.840 0.907
25 0.795 0.862 0.930
26 0.816 0.885 0.955
27 0.838 0.909 0.981
28 0.862 0.934 1.008
29 0.886 0.961 1.037
30 0.913 0.990 1.068
31 0.940 1.020 1.100
32 0.970 1.051 1.135
33 1.001 1.085 1.171
34 1.034 1.121 1.210
35 1.069 1.160 1.252
36 1.107 1.201 1.296
37 1.148 1.245 1.344
38 1.192 1.292 1.395
39 1.239 1.343 1.450
40 1.289 1.398 1.510
41 1.344 1.458 1.574
42 1.404 1.523 1.644
43 1.470 1.594 1.721
44 1.541 1.672 1.805
45 1.620 1.757 1.897
46 1.707 1.852 2.000
47 1.804 1.957 2.113
48 1.913 2.075 2.240
49 2.035 2.208 2.384
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Figure 1. Equivalent annualized charge on balance, ı∗ , such that Rsf
(
ı∗
)
= 1 for
different ages and charges on ﬂow. We  have considered r = 0.037%, constant con-
tribution rate, and the following charges on ﬂow: fmin = 1.47%, fmax = 1.69%, and
favg = 1.58% (the charges are based on salary and assume a mandatory contribution50 2.173 2.358 2.546
uthor’s elaboration.
expressed as percentages of the afﬁliate’s salary): fmin = 1.47%,
max = 1.69%, and favg = 1.58% which corresponds to the minimum,
aximum and average PPS’s charges on ﬂow as in May  2014. Since
ependent workers in Peru have a mandatory contribution of 10% of
alary and fi are applied to it, we have ˛i = − ln(1 − 10fi) and there-
ore ˛min = 0.1590, ˛max = 0.185 and ˛avg = 0.172. We  will also
ssume that monthly risk-free is r = 0.037%, and it was  estimated
sing the inﬂation-adjusted Peruvian bonds with maturity 30 days.
he data series consists on daily observations of the corresponding
early rate from 20/12/2005 to 16/05/2014.
Table 1 and Figure 1 show ı∗ (annualized) for certain ages4
nd three scenarios for the charge on ﬂow: fmin, fmax and favg . As
xpected from (18), we observe that ı∗ is strictly increasing in age
decreasing in T), and strictly decreasing in f for a ﬁxed T. In the case
f a 40-year-old afﬁliate, or equivalently T = (65 − 40) × 12 = 300
onths, ı∗ is 1.398% per year when favg is the corresponding
harge on ﬂow. This implies that a charge on balance smaller
han 1.398% makes such scheme convenient for the 40-year-old
fﬁliate. The corresponding values for fmin and fmax are 1.289% and
.510% per year, respectively. An important age to consider is 37
ears since half of PPS’s afﬁliates are younger than that age. The
orresponding ı∗ for favg is 1.245% per year. Consequently, if the
harge on ﬂow is the system’s average (or 1.58% of salary) and
he charge on balance is greater than 1.245% per year, then the
oungest half of the afﬁliates in the system will ﬁnd the charge on
4 If E is the afﬁliate’s age, then T = (65 − E) × 12 months will be the length of the
ccumulation phase.of 10% of the afﬁliate’s salary).
Author’s elaboration.
balance undesirable. We  can observe that ı∗ ≥ 0.704% for all cases
considered in the example, and such level would make the charge
on balance to be preferred for almost all PPS’s afﬁliates. Recall that
we are considering r = 0.037%; however, an increment in r will
make the values of ı∗ smaller and therefore the charge on balance
will become less attractive.
4. Conclusions and further research
We  have developed a methodology to determine equivalent
charges on ﬂow and balance for individual account pension sys-
tems. We  have considered a risk-averse afﬁliate who wants to
maximize her expected utility of adjusted terminal wealth in a com-
plete ﬁnancial market. Then, we need to solve the corresponding
stochastic control problems to ﬁnd and compare the maximum ter-
minal certainty equivalent (CE) which can be achieved under both
charge schemes. Under a ﬁxed contribution rate, an exponential
utility function and no initial amount in the IA, we are able to ﬁnd
the equivalent charges (those which make both schemes indifferent
in terms of terminal CE) by solving a nonlinear equation involv-
ing only the future values of two  continuous annuities. Moreover,
the results will hold for any utility function and investment strat-
egy since market completeness allows us to work in a risk-neutral
environment.
The methodology was  applied to the Peruvian Private Pension
System (PPS) in order to determine the equivalent charge on bal-
ance for different accumulation horizons and three scenarios for
the charge on ﬂow. We found that a charge on balance lower
than 0.704% per year would make such scheme preferable to the
one based on ﬂow for almost all PPS’s afﬁliates. However, such
threshold assumes a monthly risk-free rate of 0.037%, a constant
contribution rate and a ﬁxed charge on ﬂow greater than 1.47%
of the afﬁliate’s salary. It is possible to extend this methodology to
consider a time-varying contribution rate, risk-free rate and charge
on balance, as well as other modiﬁcations preserving market com-
pleteness. Finally, it will be worth to perform a complete analysis
in a general equilibrium environment considering a welfare target;
but, this is beyond the scope of the paper.
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